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INTRODUCTION
No more genocide -the nations of the world reacted to the shock of the systematic mass extermination of European Jews and other ethnic groups during World War II by agreeing to act pre-emptively against future threats of genocide. The '90s began with President Bush declaring a "new world order where brutality will go un-rewarded and aggression will meet collective resistance." 3 Yet, in 1998, President Clinton apologized to the Rwandan people for failure to act against the most efficient genocide of the century. Why, in 1994, did the United States of America, as the world's leader in human rights, decide not to act while up to a million Rwandans were murdered?
The purpose of the paper is to examine the personal, organizational and interagency issues that led to the decision not to intervene militarily in Rwanda during the 90 days of the genocide. The analysis will show that a lack of executive level (political) leadership allowed personal and organizational factors within the bureaucracy to determine national policy.
Initially, this paper discusses the previous experiences of the principals, the organizations and possible pre-conceptions. Secondly, the paper analyzes how they viewed the Rwandan crisis and formed their positions. It then addresses the interactions that resulted in the final decision. Finally, comment is made on the enduring effects of that decision on US policy making. The paper is limited to US decisions and is not concerned with the actions of international players except where there is a direct effect on US decisions. While covering much of the same material as the references, this paper is not concerned with apportioning blame, and deliberately does not assess the rights or wrongs of the decisions made during the genocide in Rwanda.
PROLOGUE -SOMALIA TO RWANDA
"The world can…fulfill the long-held promise of a new wo ld order, where brutality will go unrewarded and aggression will meet collective resistance. Yes, the United States bears a major sha e of the leadership in this effort…has both the moral standing and the means to back it up r r " As early as December 1992, the Pentagon had recognized the inevitability of change with a statement by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Powell -"I believe peacekeeping and humanitarian operations are a given. Likewise our forward presence is a given -to signal commitment to our allies and give second thoughts to any disturber of the peace". 
DECISIONS IN CRISIS -90 DAYS OF GENOCIDE
"All over the world, there were people like me sitting in offices…who did not fully appreciate the depth and the speed with which you were being engulfed by this unimaginable horror".
President Clinton, March 1998 8
Days of Terror
On 6 April 1994, the aircraft carrying the Rwandan President, Juvenal
Habyarimana, and the Burundian President, Cyprien Ntarymira, was shot down killing all on board. Government troops and Hutu militia commenced the systematic murder of the opposition Prime Minister, the president of the constitutional court, priests, Tutsi officials and sympathizers, followed by a general Hutu uprising against the Tutsi population at the rate of some 10,000 deaths per day. On the second day, 10 captured Belgian peacekeepers were murdered prompting a Belgian request to the United Nations to either dramatically increase the UNAMIR's mandate or immediately withdraw. On 21 April, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) voted to withdraw most UN forces from Rwanda -by which time some 250,000 Tutsi were dead. By 16 May, public pressure resulting from media, human rights organizations and diplomatic reporting of the slaughter resulted in a UN resolution to provide a military force of 5,500 troops. The UN force was poorly supported and was still not effectively deployed over two months later.
France announced that it would unilaterally intervene and received UNSC approval on 22
June, setting up a humanitarian zone in southwest Rwanda in early July. Tutsi forces captured the Rwandan capital of Kigali on 4 July setting up a new Government a fortnight later. The violence had ended when US troops arrived in August to support the humanitarian assistance operation in the Central Africa region -they departed in October.
The Contentious Decisions
There was no single presidential decision that stated that the US would not intervene to stop the genocide in Rwanda. The inaction was the result of a series of individual decisions developed within the Administration that, taken collectively, had the effect of setting national policy. The contributory decisions that will be addressed in this paper are those that were contained in a series of declassified US government documents published in August 2001. 9 The documents show that:
• While US ground forces were not directly involved, the US Administration lobbied for total withdrawal of other UN forces in Rwanda in April 1994;
• US officials did not publicly acknowledge 'genocide' in Rwanda until 10 June.
• The United States acted to dissuade other countries from intervening in Rwanda.
The Political Environment and External Influences
Before addressing the actions and beliefs of the key players and organizations within the Administration, it would be fruitful to address the broader environment that influenced their decisions at the time. As in all political decision-making, the primary influences were the interlinked views of the media, Congress and public opinion. To a lesser extent, the decision makers were influenced by international opinion, the United Nations and human rights organizations.
Considering the magnitude of the crisis, the Rwandan genocide was somewhat remarkable for the absence of media pressure on the government for action of any kind.
While the daily savagery was accurately covered, it was reported as a 'typical' African civil war and tribal dispute. Africa had never been at the forefront of US interests and the media's knowledge of Africa and its politics was poor. Time magazine reported on "tribal carnage" and "pure tribal enmity". 10 The New York Post referred to "Africa's heart of darkness". 11 There was certainly no questioning of the Clinton Administration's inaction on Rwanda. The New York Times wrote, "to enter this conflict without a defined mission or a plausible military plan risks a repetition of the debacle in Somalia".
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During the 90 days of genocide, the media exerted no influence on the decision-makers within the Administration, except perhaps to imply support for whatever action they were contemplating.
Republican Senate Minority Leader, Bob Dole, summed up Congress' view of the Rwandan crisis in a press statement on 10 April -"I don't think that we have any national interest there". 13 By and large, the American public maintained the traditional disinterest in foreign affairs issues; consequently, there was no pressure on Congress to take a position, let alone to act. The African sub-committees and the Congressional Black Caucus raised concerns but avoided arguing for a military commitment in the light of the public backlash from the Mogadishu deaths six months earlier. Once again, the only pressure that policy makers felt was the need to convince Congress that the Clinton Administration was much more cautious about committing ground troops and resources overseas than they had been with Somalia.
In summary, there were no domestic political actors pressing for action in Rwanda that would compel the policy advisers in the National Security Council, State and Defense to review their policies.
The National Security Council (NSC)
The NSC's role is to support the President. In relation to the growing crisis in
Rwanda, that meant primarily avoiding engagement in a conflict that did not directly affect the United States or its direct interests, and convincing Congress that the Administration had a responsible and cautious approach to peacekeeping operations. As a by-product of these goals the NSC sought to ensure that the Clinton Administration could not be accused of standing aside during the genocide while others had acted. These goals led to the three contentious decisions listed earlier.
Clinton's National Security Advisor was Anthony Lake. As the senior White House official responsible for foreign policy, Lake should have been leading the development of policies on Rwanda. In fact, in his own words, Lake was "busy with Richard Clarke was primarily concerned with developing a formal peacekeeping doctrine subsequently known as PDD-25. While this presidential decision directive set out considerations for the employment of US forces for peacekeeping missions, the policy effect was to limit future US involvement, minimize the risk to US deployed forces and limit political fallout by opposing UN activities that the US would not directly support with its own forces. PDD-25 was approved on 3 May 1994 and became the basis for Clarke's policy recommendations on Rwanda. Richard Clarke was a highly respected, career civil servant who knew how to work the interagency system. With Lake's detachment from the Rwandan crisis, Clarke spoke with the full authority of the NSC and had access to the highest levels in the Administration.
Department of State
In regard to Rwanda, the leadership within State mirrored the lack of interest operations" and "that we would get prematurely committed to ill-considered foreign adventures".
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After Somalia, Defense officials were in the envious position of not having to argue a case for action, only to maintain the status quo. In the prevailing political climate, military action was unlikely to be strongly pursued by any of the parties;
however, Defense also felt the need to avoid mission creep by opposing softer options that involved Defense assets. Their 'action channel' was to raise problems, costs and unpalatable consequences of actions being proposed by others. A proposal to jam radio 'hate messages' was initially opposed on the bases of cost and diversion of scarce aviation assets and, finally, a specious legal opinion that it "would be contrary to US constitutional protection of freedom of the press, freedom of speech". 18 The 17 May decision to deploy 60 US military vehicles in support of UN forces was rendered ineffective by Pentagon delays over leasing costs and equipment specifications that prevented their use until August. Interestingly, when the White House exhibited leadership and issued orders to respond to the humanitarian crisis in Goma, the Pentagon had effective troops on the ground providing fresh water within three to four days.
Decision -Making -The Interagency Process and the Principals
The State Department chaired daily interagency meetings of mid-level officials to coordinate policy advice -the meetings often held by tele-conference. As discussed, the were expert in African affairs were unable to prevail in the interagency process.
A generous interpretation would be that the Executive was shy of making a difficult decision that did not seem to be important at the time and left it to the bureaucratic process. Regardless, the effect of this lack of strong leadership was that civil service professionals, who were neither elected nor congressionally approved, determined the US national interest and policy response on Rwanda. Never again?
